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The loss of the gods is a twofold process. On the one hand, the world picture is 
Christianized inasmuch as the cause of the world is posited as infinite, unconditional, 
absolute. On the other hand, Christendom transforms Christian doctrine into a world 
view (the Christian world view), and in that way makes itself modern and up to date. . . . 
But the loss of the gods is so far from excluding religiosity that rather only through the 
loss is the relation of the gods changed into mere “religious experience.” When this 
occurs, then the gods have fled. The resultant void is compensated for by means of 
historiographical and psychological investigation of myth.  
 —Martin Heidegger, The Age of the World Picture1 
 
* Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, Tel Aviv University. The author would like to thank 
participants in the “‘Law As . . .’: Theory and Method in Legal History” conference at UC Irvine and 
especially John Comaroff for their helpful comments. An earlier draft of the paper was presented at 
the Center for Jewish Law and Contemporary Civilization at Cardozo Law School and greatly 
benefitted from comments and suggestions made by participants of the graduate fellowship program. 
Further thanks are owed to Amit Deutscher for his excellent research assistance. This research was 
supported by the Israel Science Foundation (grant No. 1517/09). 
1. MARTIN HEIDEGGER, The Age of the World Picture, in THE QUESTION CONCERNING 
TECHNOLOGY 115, 116 (William Lovitt trans., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 1977) (1954).  
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How might one “go about gaining new imaginative leverage to enliven the 
practice of legal history,” asks the call for papers, appealing for a paradigm shift. 
Presumably, a new perspective is needed not simply because “law and” has run its 
course, but because it was committed from the outset to an unimaginative, 
“realist” perception of law. Presumably, “law as . . .” is an attractive alternative not 
only for its novelty, but because it calls upon us to imagine. The turn to metaphor 
is offered as a way to free us from the bonds of empiricism, historicism and other 
isms. The disenchanting spell of the social sciences is to be complemented by a re-
enchanted writing of legal history. 
Indeed, the work of many legal historians and other “law and” scholars in 
recent years has been to disenchant law. These scholars, differences of theory and 
method notwithstanding, have questioned law’s high ideals and abstract concepts, 
replacing them with the mechanisms of worldly interests, social structures, cultural 
predispositions, and power dynamics. More recently, a countermovement has 
emerged, which is as critical of legal realism as it is of legal formalism; both are to 
blame for ignoring the true force of law, which lies beyond the reductions of law 
to either conceptual reason or empirical experience. This alternative line of 
scholarship seeks to unveil the specters that continue to haunt law’s domain. 
Following Benjamin, Schmitt, Derrida, and Agamben, it draws attention to the 
shades of a sacred past or of a transcendent future that lurk beneath the surface of 
rational-secularized law.  
But how radical is this alternative? Perhaps not as radical as its adherents 
seem to imply. To begin with, one should recall that the tension between legal 
enchanters and disenchanters is, in fact, not all that new. It is evident in the 
differences between Weber and Durkheim, Kelsen and Schmitt, Kirschheimer and 
Benjamin, Arendt and Jonas, and many other writers of the late nineteenth century 
and the first half of the twentieth. This fact, in itself, suggests that despite their 
antagonism, a close affinity exists between the enchanters and the disenchanters of 
modern legal theory. But what precisely is the nature of this affinity? 
The following paper will not directly address this fundamental question of 
legal theory.2 It will rather pursue a parallel question in the field of legal history. Its 
aim is to think through the relationship between science, realism, and 
disenchantment on the one hand, and metaphor, imagination, and enchantment, 
on the other hand, as this relationship unfolds in the history of modern Jewish 
law. We will see how these two moments of disenchantment and enchantment, 
which often seem to exclude each other, are, in the final analysis, two 
complementary sides of modern law. Thus between the lines of the following 
study, one may find a Jewish parable about the “law and” and “law as . . .” of 
 
2. For a recent discussion of similar questions, see Yishai Blank, The Re-Enchantment of Law, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 633 (2011).  
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modern legal history. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Germany, during the last decades of the eighteenth century and well into 
the nineteenth, several Jewish religious practices came into sharp conflict with 
emerging moral sensitivities and public health regulations.3 Burial of the dead, 
ritual bath, circumcision, and animal slaughter were criticized by experts and lay 
observers, Jews and non-Jews alike, for offending the moral sensitivities and legal 
standards of a Kulturstaat.4 These debates mark an important transformation in the 
relationship between state regulation and religious custom, and studying them may 
offer an opportunity to reexamine the secular foundations of modern law and 
politics.  
Scholars of German-Jewish history have commonly examined the conflicts 
between state law and religious practice through the prism of the secularization 
thesis.5 As is well known, the thesis, first articulated by Weber, ascribed to 
modernity a tripartite process—a decline in religious belief and practice, the 
privatization of religion, and the separation of the life-world into autonomous 
spheres of rationality independent of religion. More recently, the revival of religion 
in the public sphere in and outside of the West has led scholars to question some 
of the assumptions of Weber’s secularization thesis. To defend the thesis, 
however, continues to be the dominant trend in the literature, offering limited 
revisions to Weber’s original claim.6  
Most notably, Charles Taylor, in his recent Secular Age, identifies religion with 
belief and explains why religious beliefs, as prevalent as they may still be in the 
modern world, have lost their original foundation.7 Belief has become a matter of 
 
3. See generally JACOB KATZ, DIVINE LAW IN HUMAN HANDS: CASE STUDIES IN HALAKHIC 
FLEXIBILITY (1998). 
4. See discussion, infra Part II. 
5. The Weberian paradigm was introduced to the study of German-Jewish history by Jacob 
Katz. See generally JACOB KATZ, OUT OF THE GHETTO: THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF JEWISH 
EMANCIPATION, 1770–1870 (1973)[hereinafter KATZ, OUT OF THE GHETTO]. Whether implicitly or 
explicitly, many scholars have followed a similar path. See, e.g., MORDECHAI BREUER, MODERNITY 
WITHIN TRADITION: THE SOCIAL HISTORY OF ORTHODOX JEWRY IN IMPERIAL GERMANY (1992); 
JOHN M. EFRON, MEDICINE AND THE GERMAN JEWS: A HISTORY (2001). Most recently, see 
SHMUEL FEINER, SHORSHEI HAHILOON, THE ORIGINS OF JEWISH SECULARIZATION IN 
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY EUROPE (Chaya Naor trans., 2010). 
6. Jose Casanova, for one, has argued that of the three tenets of the secularization thesis, only 
the third—the emergence of autonomous spheres of rationality—is essential for understanding the 
secularization of modern society. See generally JOSÉ CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN 
WORLD (1994).  
7. CHARLES TAYLOR, A SECULAR AGE (2007). Likewise, Jürgen Habermas has claimed that 
ours may be a postsecular age, but only in the sense that we must be open to the possibility that the 
processes of secularization, which have in fact taken place in Europe, are not necessarily universally 
valid. See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, Notes on a Post-Secular Society available at www.signandsight. 
Com/features/1714.html. 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
816 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
individual choice and is in constant need of justification. Similarly, in one of the 
most recent contributions to the study of eighteenth-century German Jewry, 
Shmuel Feiner offers new evidence to support the secularization thesis. Feiner 
adds to the existing study of intellectual history a new inquiry into daily belief and 
practice, and yet he continues to identify religion with otherworldly beliefs, and 
secularization with their demise.8 Thus, despite their important contributions, 
Taylor and Feiner, along with other scholars of secularism, continue to work 
within the Weberian paradigm, which identifies religion with otherworldly beliefs 
and secularization with the undermining of such beliefs through processes of 
rationalization. I will refer to this prevalent discourse on religion and the secular 
age as “secularism.”9  
The following study offers a more fundamental critique of the secularization 
thesis, one which goes to the heart of the secularist discourse. In it I return to the 
history of Jewish law in nineteenth-century Germany in order to critically examine 
some of the common tenets of secularism and their significance for understanding 
the relationship between Jewish religion and state law. The main thrust of the 
argument is that the Weberian paradigm of secularization offers a one-sided 
account of the processes of modernity, or at least of modern Judaism. It contrasts 
an enchanted religious past with a disenchanted secular present and remains blind 
to the ways in which its own characterization of religion has emerged together 
with the secular world. Contrary to the dominant Weberian paradigm, I will 
suggest that the secular age has simultaneously invented both itself and a very 
specific image of its “religious” past. “Religion,” as commonly employed today, is 
not the premodern antithesis of a secular present, but rather a modern 
understanding that emerged side by side with the secular age. Rather than an 
opposition between an enchanted past and a disenchanted presence, we should 
recognize two equally modern and complementary movements of disenchantment 
and enchantment.  
A fundamental critique of secularism along these lines is important, first, to 
overcome the false identification of our present age with the secular and the 
rational, and second, to open new ways for understanding the past, and specifically 
the “religious” past, not merely as a mirror image of the present. Furthermore, the 
following is not limited to a critique of a prevalent discourse on religion. The 
modern conceptualization of the European religious past, and specifically its 
Jewish past, as “enchanted,” is not only a discursive construct, but captures a 
genuine and typically modern religious experience. It is this modern experience of 
religion as “enchantment” that is then also projected onto the past. Thus, my 
argument is that the enchantment and disenchantment of religion are equally 
 
8. FEINER, supra note 5. 
9. MAX WEBER, Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions, in FROM MAX WEBER: 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 323 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2001) 
(1946). 
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modern and take place both outside the religious community as discourse, and 
from within the religious community as experience. 
The term “enchantment” requires some further clarification and 
disambiguation. The term is used here in a broad sense to include all forms of 
intensifying and enlivening religious experience. The Weberian sense of 
“enchantment” is significantly narrower. For Weber, premodern religion is 
enchanted to the extent to which it fuses worldly and the otherworldly 
experiences, while the process of disenchantment is essentially the gradual 
separation of the supranatural from the worldly. Weber’s notion of enchantment is 
in fact only one among several ways of “enchanting” religion. In what follows, our 
interest lies in the way religious practice is enchanted in a variety of ways through 
the “ritualization” of religious practice.  
In speaking of “ritualization” I am relying, in part, on Talal Asad’s work on 
the transformation of the concept of ritual, which took place during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 10 Asad documents the rise of a modern, 
“anthropological” conception of “ritual,” which views religious practice as 
symbolic interaction and suffuses traditional customs with webs of meaning and 
signification, intensifying and enlivening religious practice. According to Asad, the 
modern notion of ritual replaced a more traditional notion of ritual as a manual—
a set of practices the importance of which lay not in their meaning, but rather in 
precise adherence to the detail of these well-prescribed rules of conduct. A more 
elaborate account of the notion of “ritualization” will unfold in what follows. My 
argument, to repeat, is that modernization consists not of a one-dimensional 
process of secularization understood as rationalization, but rather of a twofold 
process of rationalization and “ritualization” of religion. 
The choice to explore the interplay of secularization and ritualization by 
examining traditional Jewish practices in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century 
Germany is significant. If the Jews are of special interest, it is not only for their 
privileged place in the history of modern Europe, but also due to their importance 
in understanding the transformation of “the law.” No European nation seems to 
have tied its fate to “the law” as the Jews have, and no Jewish community has 
undergone such a radical transformation as German Jewry at the turn of the 
nineteenth century. Indeed, as one scholar has noted, “German Jewry was the 
most visible of the modern European Jewries because in its history all of the 
hallmarks of modernity seemed to have converged in their fullest and most 
volatile forms.”11  
But the history of so-called Jewish rituals is not only a locus classicus for 
deciphering processes of modernization; it simultaneously offers an external 
 
10. TALAL ASAD, GENEALOGIES OF RELIGION: DISCIPLINE AND REASONS OF POWER IN 
CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM 55–82 (1993). 
11. DAVID J. SORKIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF GERMAN JEWRY, 1780–1840, at 3 (1987). 
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vantage point from which these processes can be critically observed. Theories of 
secularization emerged, at least in part, out of a specifically Christian 
understanding of religion and were applied to Jewish ritual without a proper 
appreciation of the unique characteristics of Jewish law. Consequently, an 
examination of Jewish history may provide an opportunity to question some of 
the taken-for-granted assumptions of secularization and to identify the 
accompanying process of ritualization.  
Finally, though ours is a history of the Jewish-German past, it is important to 
bear in mind its possible implications for understanding the present, when 
Muslims have taken the place of Jews as the largest religious minority in Europe.12 
The comparison, which may seem speculative at first, has in fact a historical 
foundation. As we shall see, Jews and Jewish ritual were commonly identified as 
Oriental in nineteenth-century Germany. The comparison becomes unavoidable 
once we note that certain rituals, especially animal slaughter and circumcision, 
have direct parallels in the two religions and raise questions today similar to those 
they raised nearly two centuries ago in a very different context.13 
The paper will proceed as follows: The first part will examine the way in 
which contemporary scholars have commonly sought to characterize the tension 
between Jewish religious practice and the modern state. The second part will point 
to the one-sidedness of the secularization thesis and juxtapose it with 
“ritualization” as a different and complementary perspective. The third and final 
part will explore the different ways in which ritualization processes have shaped 
the understanding, practice, and regulation of Jewish law, by focusing on the case 
study of animal slaughter.14  
PART I: MODERNIZATION AS SECULARIZATION 
Since Weber, the study of modern religion has been commonly associated 
with processes of rationalization, secularization, and the transformation of religion 
from an otherworldly to a worldly concern. Though it is clear that Weber 
developed his thinking within the context of Christian Europe, he and many of his 
followers extended the general approach to premodern societies and non-Western 
religions. Writing within a Weberian scheme, scholars of the Jewish 
Enlightenment concluded that Jewish society and Jewish religion had undergone 
similar transformations to those Weber ascribed to Christianity. First, scholars 
 
12. See generally Tel Aviver Jahrbuch für deutsche Geschichte, JUDEN UND MUSLIME IN 
DEUTSCHLAND: RECHT, RELIGION, IDENTITÄT [JEWS AND MUSLIMS IN GERMANY: LAW, 
RELIGION AND IDENTITY] (José Brunner & Shai Lavi eds., 2009).  
13. See discussion infra Part III. 
14. This part of the Paper belongs to a larger project on the history of Jewish and Muslim 
animal slaughter in Germany. See Shai Lavi, Animal Laws and the Politics of Life: Slaughterhouse Regulation 
in Germany, 1870–1917, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 221 (2007); Shai Lavi, Unequal Rites: Jews, 
Muslims and the History of Ritual Slaughter in Germany, in JUDEN UND MUSLIME IN DEUTSCHLAND: 
RECHT, RELIGION, IDENTITÄT, supra note 12.  
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interpreted Jewish emancipation and the subsiding autonomy of the Jewish 
community as the retreat of religion from the public sphere to the private domain. 
Religion, and specifically Christianity, no longer provided the overarching 
framework of law and politics; Jews, like Christians, became members of a 
religiously neutral (or semi-neutral) society, and religion was relegated to the 
private sphere.15  
Second, and consequently, religious institutions and customs, which were at 
odds with the emerging neutral public sphere, had to be reformed or abolished.16 
Religious practices could be carried on in the private domain, through voluntary 
associations and personal belief. Religious ritual and religious ceremony could 
continue only on the condition that they were adapted to the new understanding 
of religion as a personal and spiritual concern.17 Third, even marginal religious 
groups, such as Jewish Orthodoxy, which seemingly rejected these secularization 
processes, were in fact deeply influenced by them both positively and negatively. 
In conformity with the general trend, some Orthodox rabbis justified traditional 
Jewish law on rational grounds, whereas other Orthodox rabbis closed ranks in a 
counterreaction and vehemently opposed any change in the custom itself.18 
This Weberian scheme, as we shall see, has played a significant role in 
framing contemporary studies of Jewish religious practice in late eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century Germany. In what follows, I will briefly chronicle the conflicts 
between four Jewish “rituals” and state law: burial of the dead, the ritual bath, 
circumcision, and animal slaughter. These summaries of contemporary scholarly 
accounts exemplify the continued productivity of the Weberian model, but hint at 
its limitations as well.  
One of the first Jewish customs to come into conflict with modern state law 
concerned the burial of the dead.19 In 1772, the Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin 
issued the first set of German regulations regarding Jewish burials, requiring Jews 
to allow at least three days to elapse between death and burial. The ordinance 
stood in flat contradiction to the Jewish practice of burying the dead as soon as 
possible, a fact which troubled the Jewish community of the duchy and its 
surroundings.  
The reason for the new regulation was a growing anxiety over premature 
 
15. KATZ, OUT OF THE GHETTO, supra note 5. 
16. FEINER, supra note 5. 
17. See generally MICHAEL A. MEYER, RESPONSE TO MODERNITY: A HISTORY OF THE 
REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM (1995). 
18. See generally JACOB KATZ, A HOUSE DIVIDED: ORTHODOXY AND SCHISM IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY CENTRAL EUROPEAN JEWRY (Ziporah Brody trans., 1998)[hereinafter 
KATZ, A HOUSE DIVIDED]. 
19. The following account is based on JACOB KATZ, HA-HALAKHAH BE-METSAR: 
MIKHSHOLIM AL DEREKH HA-ORTODOKSYAH BE-HITHAVUTAH [DIVINE LAW IN HUMAN 
HANDS: CASE STUDIES IN HALAKHIC FLEXIBILITY] (1992); Falk Wiesemann, Jewish Burials in Germany 
— Between Tradition, the Enlightenment and the Authorities, 37 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 17 (1992). 
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burial. The archetypical fear of premature burial spread across Europe in the 
second half of the eighteenth century.20 The Gothic image of the living dead 
found its counterpart in the fear of being buried alive. The anxiety of premature 
burial made its way into the ranks of the enlightened Prussian bureaucracy, which 
set regulations to prohibit early burial. New police regulations prohibited burial for 
three days after apparent death. It was only then, when the body began to rot, that 
one could be confident of death. These regulations, which were first imposed on 
the Jews in the 1770s, spread throughout Germany and remained in force well 
into the second half of the nineteenth century.  
Unlike their Christian neighbors, German Jews held to a tradition that 
required the burial of the dead as early as possible so as not to violate the halachic 
prohibition of leaving the corpse unburied (halanat hamet). The new regulations 
were perceived as a blatant affront to Jewish tradition and custom and an 
infringement on the Jewish community’s autonomy to administer its internal 
religious affairs. 
Leaders of the Jewish community in Prussia turned to Moses Mendelssohn, 
hoping that the respect he enjoyed from state authorities would prompt them to 
revoke the decree. Mendelssohn did not decline his brethren’s request, but neither 
did he wish to betray the spirit of the Enlightenment, and thus he sat down to 
write two letters. The first he addressed to the Duke, asking him to show tolerance 
of the ancient Jewish ritual; the other he sent to the Jewish community, explaining 
why the practice in dispute was not an ancient tradition at all. He argued that in 
Talmudic times Jews had in fact waited several days before burying their dead. 
Mendelssohn’s legal opinion was unorthodox in both its mode of reasoning and 
its content. He sought to derive Jewish law directly from the Talmud, ignoring 
later authorities and relying on the Talmud more for its historical than its legal 
authority. In doing so, Mendelssohn became the predecessor of the Wissenschaft des 
Judentums movement (Judaic Studies), which in the course of the nineteenth 
century introduced secular methods of research to determine questions of Jewish 
law. Eventually, Mendelssohn’s powers of persuasion seemed to appeal more to 
the Duke than to the Jewish community. The edict was repealed, while within the 
Jewish community Mendelssohn became the suspect of heresy.  
A second example concerns the Jewish ritual bath (mikveh or mikvah), which 
became a source of public controversy beginning in the 1820s.21 According to 
Jewish law, an impure person or object can become pure only after immersion in a 
body of water. Most commonly, the ritual bath is used by women after 
menstruation or childbirth, though on occasion Jewish men too have used the 
 
20. For the spread of this anxiety to the Anglo-American world, see Martin Pernick, Back from 
the Grave: Recurring Controversies over Defining and Diagnosing Death in History, in DEATH: BEYOND 
WHOLE-BRAIN CRITERIA 17 (Raymond M. Zaner ed., 1988). 
21. The following is based primarily on Thomas Schlich, Medicalization and Secularization: The 
Jewish Ritual Bath as a Problem of Hygiene (Germany 1820s–1840s), 8 SOC. HIST. MED. 423 (1995). 
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ritual bath to purify themselves. The mikveh played an important role in Jewish life, 
so much so that the community was under a religious obligation to construct a 
ritual bath, even before it built a synagogue.  
According to Jewish law, the water of the mikveh must come from a natural 
source without human mediation. A spring, a well, or a cistern filled by rain can 
serve for this purpose. To allow access to groundwater, the ritual baths were often 
located at ground level and in the basement, and were referred to as 
Kellerquellenbäder (literally, “cellar spring baths”). German physicians and other 
prominent members of society denounced the ritual bath for being damp, unclean, 
and a health risk. The mikveh was described as a “dirty cellar shut out from 
daylight,” inhabited by mice and dangerous to public health. It was portrayed as a 
detestable place in which people could catch a variety of illnesses, not least, 
venereal disease.  
The attacks on the morality of the mikveh soon became framed in the 
language of law and regulation. From 1810 to 1850 the authorities in various 
German regions examined and disapproved of many of the existing ritual baths. A 
number of decrees were published and ritual baths were shut down or refurbished 
according to hygienic standards and placed under the supervision of medical 
officers. Everything relating to the baths was specified in detail, down to the 
precise temperature of the water. Members of the Jewish community, including 
the Orthodox rabbis, cooperated with the reforms.22 
A third custom that came under harsh scrutiny was circumcision.23 The 
dispute erupted in the 1840s when a handful of Jewish fathers refused to 
circumcise their sons. The parents, some of whom were medical physicians, were 
concerned with reported cases of death, which followed from circumcision. The 
accusations concerned the “ritual practices of using the fingernail for the 
separation of the corona (periah) and the mouth (mezizah) for the removal of 
impurities from the wound.”24 According to the allegations, these unhygienic 
practices were a potential source of fatal diseases. Soon enough, state officials 
became concerned with regulating circumcision. In Hamburg, for example, to 
become a practicing mohel (circumciser), one required a certification not only from 
rabbinic authorities, but also from the state. The enforcement of medical 
standards, however, was not uniform, and in certain places, such as Dresden in 
1844, medical officers refused to apply the new standards, arguing for the sanctity 
of religious rites.  
 
22. Samson Raphael Hirsch, known also as the founder of modern Orthodoxy, encouraged 
similar improvements in Frankfurt, see Tzvia Koren-Loeb, The Frankfurt a.M. Memorbuch: Gender Roles 
in the Jewish Community Institutions, 4 WOMEN IN JUDAISM: A MULTIDISCIPLINARY J. (2007), available 
at http://wjudaism.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/wjudaism/article/view/3075. 
23. The following is based primarily on ROBIN JUDD, CONTESTED RITUALS: CIRCUMCISION, 
KOSHER BUTCHERING, AND JEWISH POLITICAL LIFE IN GERMANY, 1843–1933 (2007); KATZ, A 
HOUSE DIVIDED, supra note 18. 
24.  JUDD, supra note 23, at 24. 
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The risk to public health was only one of two issues around which the debate 
revolved. The other concerned the demand made on Jewish fathers who did not 
circumcise their children, to nevertheless register them as members of the Jewish 
community. Though Judaism is traditionally matrilineal, many rabbis refused to 
register uncircumcised children on the basis of maternal heredity, claiming that 
circumcision was a necessary condition for being a member of the Jewish 
community. Here, too, the debates that ensued within the community soon found 
their way to the public authorities. Concerned fathers turned to the non-Jewish 
authorities, pleading with them to order the rabbis to register their sons. Some 
authorities respected the decisions of the Jewish community, while others 
instructed the community to register the noncircumcised children as Jews.  
By the 1870s the controversy surrounding circumcision had subsided. The 
public health issues were resolved in a compromise that even the Orthodox-
leaning rabbis could sanction. Henceforward membership in the Jewish 
community was determined on confessional grounds, so that the Orthodox 
congregations that wished to do so could split from the central organization and 
regulate membership in the community according to their own understanding, as 
the Jewish community in Frankfurt in fact did. 
The fourth and final ritual that came under public scrutiny, and to which we 
shall return at length in what follows, concerned the ritual slaughter of animals.25 
According to Jewish tradition, for meat to be kosher, it is not enough that the 
animal itself is of a kosher kind (e.g., a cow rather than a pig); it needs to be 
slaughtered according to Jewish law, called shehitah, which means that the act must 
be performed with a sharp knife, cutting through the trachea and the esophagus in 
one swift move, by an expert and religiously certified shohet (“slaughterer”).  
The controversy concerning shehitah focused on questions of both public 
health and morality. Of the two, the question concerning the humaneness of the 
practice turned out to be more troubling and harder to resolve. With the rise of 
animal protection societies in the 1820s and 1830s, the question regarding the 
proper slaughter of animals came to the fore. At first their complaints were 
directed against ordinary, non-Jewish, slaughter. The critique referred to the 
inhumane treatment and the infliction of pain and suffering on a sentient being. 
Animal protection associations advocated the stunning of the animal prior to its 
slaughter by a blow to the head. And, indeed, slaughterhouses gradually adopted 
the new methods, which were soon imposed across Germany.  
 
25. The following is based primarily on Dorothee Brantz, Stunning Bodies: Animal Slaughter, 
Judaism, and the Meaning of Humanity in Imperial Germany, 35 CENT. EUR. HIST. 167 (2002); John M. 
Efron, The Most Cruel Cut of All? The Campaign Against Jewish Ritual Slaughter in Fin-de-Siècle Switzerland 
and Germany, 52 LEO BAECK INST. Y.B. 167 (2007); Robin Judd, Jewish Political Behaviour and the 
“Schaechtfrage,” 1880–1914, in TOWARDS NORMALITY? ACCULTURATION AND MODERN GERMAN 
JEWRY 251 (Rainer Liedtke & David Rechter eds., 2003); Shai Lavi, Animal Laws and the Politics of Life: 
Slaughterhouse Regulation in Germany, 1870–1917, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 221 (2006). 
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The stunning of animals, however, ran against Jewish law. According to the 
common interpretation of the Jewish law of slaughter, the animal is required to be 
conscious and physically intact at the moment of slaughter. The response of the 
Jewish community was, once again, twofold. On the scientific level, the Jewish 
community initiated research to prove that Jewish ritual was as humane and as 
hygienic as, and at times more so than, the new stunning methods. On the 
religious level, the community united to demand religious freedom. In addition, 
leading rabbis, including among the Orthodox, were willing to introduce changes 
into traditional practices as long as these changes did not undermine the law itself, 
but merely modified custom. Thus, for example, they changed the method 
whereby large livestock were set down on the ground prior to being slaughtered to 
make it more humane.26  
All four accounts are representative of the way current scholarship has 
examined the tension between Jewish law and state law and demonstrate the basic 
tenets of the secularization thesis. Once public law was no longer governed by 
(Christian) religion, the Jewish community began to lose its autonomy and the 
emerging regulatory state brought internal Jewish affairs and practice under its 
supervision. Jewish law was scrutinized and accused of failing to meet the 
enlightened standards of science and morality. Outside critics and internal 
reformers called upon Jews and the Jewish community to abolish certain Jewish 
practices. Anti-Jewish and anti-Semitic undertones no doubt played an important 
role in these debates, but most of the attacks tended to cloak themselves in the 
language of science and morality. Old Jewish traditions were criticized as being 
uncivilized and unbecoming of a modern age of reason, progress, and rationality, 
and were portrayed as backward and superstitious.  
The depiction of the tension between state and religion along Weberian lines 
has, no doubt, some truth to it. But such accounts uncritically accept the 
underlying assumption of the “secularization” thesis, namely, that previously 
irrational, enchanted rituals were gradually disenchanted, leading either to their 
transformation or to their abolition. In what follows I wish to supplement this 
taken-for-granted narrative, and draw attention to an equally prevalent, but much 
less documented process of “ritualization” which accompanied rationalization. 
Instead of examining the tension between Jewish rituals and the emerging secular 
German state, we must first understand precisely how Jewish practice was 
conceived of as “ritual” to begin with.  
PART II: MODERNIZATION AS RITUALIZATION 
During the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Jewish customs were 
 
26. MICHAEL L. MUNK, ET AL., EDUT NEEMANAH: SH. U-T. AL MAAVAK HA-SHEHITAH 
BE-EROPAH [RESPONSA ON HALACHIC PROBLEMS ARISING OUT OF THE DEFENSE OF SHEHITA IN 
EUROPE] (Jerusalem: Gur Arye, 1974). 
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referred to indistinguishably as ritual (Ritus), cult (Kultus), and ceremony 
(Zeremonie). Though the terms were not new in themselves, and had been used 
both in popular culture and by German law to refer both to religious practice in 
general and Jewish law in particular, they now increasingly began being used in a 
new sense.27 In what follows, I wish to focus on this new sense that traditional 
religious practice acquired, and to draw attention to what may be called the 
“ritualization” of Jewish law.28  
What precisely were these new semantics of “ritual,” and how did they affect 
the way religious law was understood, practiced, and regulated? Cultural 
anthropologists have paid close attention to the definition of “ritual” and have 
debated the precise meaning of the term, and I will rely in part on their insights. 
My interest, however, is not in the scientific accuracy of the term, but rather in its 
discursive formation and cultural connotations.  
The transformation in the discourse and practice of Jewish law consisted of 
two interrelated movements, which are characteristic of the modern notion of 
“ritual.” The first was defamiliarization. If rationalization translated the foreign 
into the familiar, “ritualization” transformed the familiar into the strange and alien. 
This aspect of “ritualization” has been described by the British cultural 
anthropologist, Siegfrid F. Nadel: “[w]hen we speak of ‘ritual,’ we have in mind 
first of all actions exhibiting a striking or incongruous rigidity, that is, some 
conspicuous regularity not accounted for by professional aims of the actions . . . .”29 
Defamiliarization involved the singling out of certain Jewish practices as peculiar, 
and is thus worthy of special attention. A variety of discourses and practices of 
defamiliarization developed, which allowed non-Jews and Jews alike to single out 
certain Jewish customs as particularly superstitious, exotic, or supernatural.  
The second element of the process of “ritualization” was symbolization, 
namely, imbuing the “ritual” with symbolic meaning beyond the practice itself. As 
Radcliff-Brown notes, “ritual acts differ from technical acts in having in all 
instances some expressive or symbolic element in them.”30 The symbolic aspect of 
the ritual may refer to a supernatural domain, but may also enliven religious 
 
27. The different shades of meaning and the nuanced distinction between ritual, ceremony, 
and cult need not concern us here, and I shall refer to all three as ritual. For a more elaborate 
discussion of this point, see Jack Goody, Religion and Ritual: The Definitional Problem, 12 BRIT. J. SOC. 
142 (1961). 
28. It is perhaps worth noting that even scholars who have dedicated their research to the 
study of Jewish ritual have taken the term “ritual” for granted, and have not reflected on its use. See, 
e.g., JUDD, supra note 23. 
29. Quoted in Goody, supra note 27, at 158. 
30. Quoted in Goody, supra note 27, at 152. Radcliff-Brown himself characterized symbolism 
very broadly: “Whatever has a meaning is a symbol and the meaning is whatever is expressed by the 
symbol.” As Goody notes, Durkheim too emphasized the symbolic character of ritual: “Durkheim 
introduces two positive characteristics of ‘ritual,’ that is, of acts oriented to sacred things. Firstly, there 
is ‘the attitude of respect . . . employed as the basic criterion for the sacredness throughout.’ Secondly, 
‘the means-end relationship is symbolic, not intrinsic.’” Goody, supra note 27, at 148. 
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practice in a more mundane way. Either way, the practice is bifurcated. The 
significance of the practice lies beyond the practice itself in another world or in 
another realm of symbolic signification. 
The two elements of defamiliarization and ritualization are in fact 
interrelated. Turning familiar practices into unfamiliar spectacles transformed 
Jewish tradition into a riddle, the symbolic and hidden significance of which has to 
be deciphered. And conversely, infusing familiar practices with supernatural, 
exotic, or otherwise enchanted signification turned commonly practiced traditions 
into unfamiliar rituals.  
Ritualization, thus defined, should be understood as a contrapuntal motion 
to rationalization. Whereas rationalization is an attempt to foster disenchantment 
with religious practice, ritualization is an attempt to enchant the practice and 
infuse it with mystery and concealed signification. Rationalization is based on the 
premise that nothing is without reason, whereas ritualization stems from the 
equally modern notion that nothing is without meaning.  
One may wonder whether Jewish law was not always a ritual in the above 
sense, and whether the labeling of Jewish practice as “ritual” was a more or less 
accurate depiction of the practice, at least as it appeared to external observers. 
Would it not be correct to describe shehitah, traditional Jewish animal slaughter, as 
a “conspicuous regularity not accounted for by professional aims”? Is it not the 
case that milah, Jewish circumcision, was always understood to bear some symbolic 
meaning and signification? What precisely was novel about the “ritualization” of 
Jewish practice?  
In his essay “Toward a Genealogy of the Concept of Ritual,” Talal Asad 
tracks an important change in the notion of “ritual” that took place around the 
eighteenth century, which may have bearing on the history of Jewish law.31 
Originally, “ritual” referred to a manual in which the details of a religious practice 
were carefully documented. Ritual in its traditional sense, writes Asad,  
is directed at the apt performance of what is prescribed, something that 
depends on intellectual and practical disciplines but does not itself require 
decoding. In other words, apt performance involves not symbols to be 
interpreted but abilities to be acquired according to rules that are 
sanctioned by those in authority: it presupposes no obscure meanings, 
but rather the formation of physical and linguistic skills.32  
During the eighteenth century, however, a new sense gradually emerges, and 
ritual “is no longer a script for regulating practice but a type of practice that is 
interpretable as standing for some further verbally definable, but tacit, event.”33 Asad 
readily acknowledges that “[t]he idea that symbols need to be decoded is not, of 
 
31. TALAL ASAD, supra note 10, at 55–82. 
32. Id. at 62. 
33. Id. at 57. 
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course, new . . . [but] it plays a new role in the restructured concept of ritual that 
anthropology has appropriated and developed from the history of Christian 
exegesis.”34 
Asad’s insights regarding the modern sense of “ritual,” its origins in Christian 
exegesis and its nineteenth-century reincarnation in sociology of religion and 
cultural anthropology are highly relevant to the understanding of the ritualization 
of Jewish law. We shall see how changes along similar lines took place not only 
among external observers of the Jewish community, but among reformers as well 
as the Orthodoxy within the Jewish community itself.  
Indeed, the term “ritual” itself was alien to the Jewish tradition. Its closest 
translation to Hebrew, pulhan, signified idol worship. Jews, at least traditionally, 
were more likely to speak of mitzvah (obligation or commandment) or halacha (a 
specific prescript, but also the entire code). Thinking of Jewish practice as “ritual” 
would have made little sense to traditionalist Jews, since for them there was 
nothing conspicuous about these practices. They were simply the way Jews led 
their daily lives and belonged to the world created by Jewish law.35  
Furthermore, and perhaps more strikingly, describing Jewish law as “ritual” 
and thus attributing signification and symbolization to traditionalist practices was 
also at odds with the self-understanding of the traditionalist Jewish community. 
Of the numerous commentaries, treatises and responsa on Jewish law written in the 
German-speaking world of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, it is 
hard to find any which address the underlying significance of the so-called “Jewish 
rituals.” Exceptions did exist, and admittedly one may find in the vast volumes of 
Jewish scholarship throughout the Middle Ages and up to the modern period 
numerous attempts to make sense of Jewish law, especially in the literature known 
as ta’amei-ha’mitzvot (“the reasoning of the commandments”). However, even when 
meaning was attributed to the practice, it was not used to determine, let alone to 
reform the practice. Furthermore, the meanings most commonly attributed to 
Jewish practices were either educational—the practice of the law would improve 
moral character—or ontological—following the precept would have a causal 
effect on well-being. It was only in the second half of the nineteenth century, as 
we shall see, that a comprehensive attempt was undertaken to interpret Jewish law 
symbolically.36  
To be sure, this is not to say that the observance of Jewish law was 
 
34. Id. at 60. 
35. Arnold Eisen claims that the traditionalist approach continued to prevail among many 
Jews including intellectuals throughout the nineteenth century. He writes, “The emphasis by Jewish 
actors on practice rather than belief provided space for a still more precious and perhaps 
indispensable strategy for dealing with modernity’s uncharted territory: avoidance of questions of 
‘ultimate meaning’ altogether.” ARNOLD M. EISEN, RETHINKING MODERN JUDAISM: RITUAL, 
COMMANDMENT, COMMUNITY 4 (1998). 
36. See generally YITZHAK HEINEMANN, TA’AME HA-MITSVOT BE-SIFRUT YIŚRAEL 2 [THE 
REASON FOR THE COMMANDMENTS IN JEWISH THOUGHT] (1993). 
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traditionally perceived as routine conduct of no significance to the observant 
community. The halacha was practiced by many with great attentiveness and 
deliberation, and was highly “meaningful,” but in a very different sense of the 
word. Its “meaning” was not symbolic or otherwise hidden, but lay rather in the 
details of the practice and careful adherence to its precise performance. Any 
mistake in the practice of slaughter would render the livestock irreversibly not 
kosher, and any divergence from the laws of immersion in the mikveh required a 
repetition of the act. In the Jewish sources themselves it is very hard to find a 
justification, a rational or even comprehensive attempt to make sense of the 
practices. Instead, one finds detailed discussion and disputes regarding the precise 
manner in which the slaughter-knife should be used, or numerous instructions for 
preparing the corpse for burial. By the second half of the nineteenth century, all 
this would have changed and Jewish practice would be perceived, criticized, and to 
certain extent affirmed and practiced as “ritual.”37  
The gradual process of “ritualization” took form in different ways and in 
different contexts. External critics of Jewish law sought and found the “meaning” 
of Jewish practices in superstitious beliefs. More sophisticated and scientifically 
inclined observers tracked the origins of many Jewish practices to the Ancient 
East, infusing Jewish-European practices with the flavors and scents of the 
Orient. The emerging Jewish Reform movement in Germany abolished certain of 
the traditional practices for being irrationally “ceremonial” or “ritualistic” and 
reinterpreted and adjusted others to fit in with an enlightened notion of proper 
religion, i.e., nonritualistic worship. Orthodoxy too incorporated the new notion 
of “ritual” into its world. As we shall see, a small group of mystically inspired 
rabbis attempted to enliven traditional practices with supernatural signification. 
The larger group of enlightened German neo-Orthodoxy offered a new 
interpretation of Jewish ritual which placed the symbolic meaning of Jewish law at 
its core.  
To trace the process of “ritualization” and its concrete articulations, I wish to 
closely examine one instance of the transformation of Jewish law into ritual, 
namely, the case of the Jewish slaughter of animals. Though the practice of animal 
slaughter is one example among many, it has several unique characteristics that 
may help clarify the change. Unlike circumcision, animal slaughter is a daily 
practice and is required in the everyday preparation of meat for consumption. 
Unlike the ritual bath and burial, it is not entirely internal to the Jewish community 
and had important ramifications for the interrelationship of Jews and Christians. 
And, finally, like circumcision it has clear affinities with Muslim practice.  
The history of shehitah in Europe has recently captured scholarly attention 
and valuable studies have examined the ritual slaughter debate, known as the 
 
37. In fact, the ritualization of Jewish custom was not all encompassing. Many Jews continued 
to practice the law long after it lost any possible “meaning.” 
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Schächtfrage, in Germany between 1871 and 1933.38 Most scholars of fin-de-siècle 
Germany have focused on processes of rationalization, promoted by a strong and 
centralized German state, well-established animal protection organizations, and a 
highly secularized Jewish community. It is in looking back to the turn of the 
nineteenth century that one may perceive a parallel movement of ritualization 
which has played an equally important role in forming the historical debate. 
Similarly, scholars who have studied the more contemporary resurfacing of the 
slaughter debate in post-World War II Germany39 have generally failed to note the 
fact that the contemporary debate has its roots in a long and turbulent past.40  
PART III: RITUALIZATION AND THE CASE OF ANIMAL SLAUGHTER 
The Hebraists 
The process of ritualization and the modern drive to decipher the meaning 
of Jewish religious practice reached a climax at the turn of the eighteenth century, 
and yet their roots lie in the early modern period, in post-Reformation Germany. 
It is important to take this earlier history into account in order to understand the 
Christian baggage that eighteenth- and nineteenth-century observers brought with 
them to the realm of Jewish custom. 
Early signs of the “ritualization” of Jewish practice can be found in the late 
fifteenth-century studies known as the Hebraica literature. In these studies, 
Renaissance scholars such as Pico de la Mirandola (1463–1494) and Johann 
Reuchlin (1455–1522) observed Jewish traditional customs from a new 
perspective. The Hebraist writers, both Christian-born and Jewish converts, 
initiated the study of the Old Testament and post-Biblical sources in the original 
Hebrew, and introduced a new thematic that had little precedent in medieval 
Christian literature.41 Though this literature was often critical of Jewish custom 
and tradition, and one can detect in it more than a touch of the old Christian 
venom toward Jews, it would be a mistake to see in these texts, as some have, 
early signs of modern anti-Semitism. They are set in the context of a religious 
conflict not simply between a dominant majority and a subordinated minority, but 
between Jews, who still saw themselves as the Chosen People, superior in the eyes 
of God, and Christians, for whom the inferiority of the Jews had to be 
continuously demonstrated, a conflict that at least within the Hebraica literature 
 
38. Brantz, supra note 25; JUDD, supra note 23; Efron, supra note 25. 
39. See, e.g., RICHARD POTZ ET AL., SCHÄCHTEN: RELIGIONSFREIHEIT UND TIERSCHUTZ 
(2001). 
40. But see PASCAL KRAUTHAMMER, DAS SCHÄCHTVERBOT IN DER SCHWEIZ 1854–2000: 
DIE SCHÄCHTFRAGE ZWISCHEN TIERSCHUTZ, POLITIK UND FREMDENFEINDLICHKEIT, ZÜRCHER 
STUDIEN ZUR RECHTSGESCHICHTE 42 (2000).  
41. R. Po-chia Hsia, Christian Ethnographies of Jews in Early Modern Germany, in THE EXPULSION 
OF THE JEWS: 1492 AND AFTER 223–37 (Raymond B. Waddington & Arthur H. Williamson eds., 
1994). 
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was commonly justified as emerging from a duty to save the souls of the Jews. In 
this literature, however, the Jews were no longer charged with their mistaken 
adherence to the Old Covenant, but rather with the fabrication of a new 
Covenant—the Talmud—which was far removed from the word of God.42 
Hebraica literature, in this sense, differed from both the late medieval disputes 
between Jews and Christians and the later nineteenth-century anti-Semitism of 
German-Christian nationalists directed against emancipated Jews. Precisely for this 
reason, one may see this literature as a distinct phenomenon, and one which, as we 
shall see, prepared the grounds for the transformation of Jewish practice from 
custom into ritual.  
It is in this venue that the treatises developed a new criticism of Jewish 
tradition. The authors tend to focus on Jewish customs, which would have been 
less familiar to their Christian readership, and specifically on customs that do not 
appear in the Bible or would not be commonly associated with it. Animal 
slaughter, for example, is discussed much more often in this literature than the 
prohibition on pork. The authors, remarkably knowledgeable regarding the minute 
details of Jewish slaughter, emphasize its pedantic character, at times to the point 
of ridicule.43 Since reference to the divine command to slaughter can be found in 
the Bible only in one verse,44 which itself does not specify the details, the very 
proliferation of lengthy manuals on the laws of shehitah proved the extent to which 
Jews had departed from the word of God. Buxtorf (1564–1629), for example, 
ridicules the lengthy discussions in rabbinic literature about the rules of inspecting 
the carcass for lesions known as tereffa, when the plain and original meaning of the 
word refers to cattle devoured by a wild animal out in the open field.45 
Another set of accusations leveled against shehitah concerned the alleged 
disrespect and even hatred that practicing Jews showed toward Christians. Some 
authors complained that the very fact that Jews viewed animals slaughtered by 
Christians as not kosher, equating them with carrion (nevela), was a sign of 
disrespect. Others claimed that the laws of shehitah humiliated Christians by 
offering them the rear parts of slaughtered cattle, which Jews were prohibited 
from consuming.46 The slaughtered body of the animal was thus perceived as a 
 
42. A similar critique seems to have emerged already in the twelfth century. See Amos 
Funkenstein, Changes in the Patterns of Christian Anti-Jewish Polemics in the Twelfth Century, 33 ZION 56 
(1968). 
43. Here and in the analysis that follows I often rely on the important contribution to the 
study of Hebraist literature on Jewish rituals by YAAKOV DEUTSCH, JUDAISM IN CHRISTIAN EYES 
256 (2004). 
44. “If the place which the LORD thy God shall choose to put His name there be too far 
from thee, then thou shalt kill of thy herd and of thy flock, which the LORD hath given thee, as I 
have commanded thee, and thou shalt eat within thy gates, after all the desire of thy soul.” Deuteronomy 
12:21. 
45. DEUTSCH, supra note 43. 
46. Compare this with a similar medieval complaint discussed in JEREMIAH JOSEPH BERMAN, 
SHEHITAH: A STUDY IN THE CULTURAL AND SOCIAL LIFE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE 218 (1941). 
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mirror image of the social relationship and symbolic interaction.  
From Hebraist to Modern Anthropology 
By the eighteenth century a further step had been taken in the “ritualization” 
of Jewish tradition. A new gaze, that of modern anthropology, was directed at 
Jewish custom. The new accounts of Jewish ritual were based on scientific rather 
than theological discourse. Still, it is important to appreciate the continuity to the 
same extent as the break between the two accounts. It is in this context that we 
now turn to the writings of Johann Jacob Schudt, perhaps the last author of the 
Hebraist tradition and arguably the first anthropologist of Jewish custom. It is 
through a close examination of Schudt’s work that we will be able to appreciate 
the ways in which modern anthropology “ritualized” Jewish religion at least as 
much as it “secularized” it, in both cases in ways that were dependent on, yet 
unfamiliar to, the Hebraist scholars.  
Schudt was born in Frankfurt am Main in 1664, studied the Orient including 
Hebraistica in Hamburg, and published several books in the field. His discussion 
of Jewish custom as “ritual” appears in his magnum opus, The Pecularities of the Jews 
(Jüdische Merckwürdigkeiten), a four-volume edition which came out in 1716 in 
Frankfurt and in Leipzig. The multifaceted nature of the book, its different 
motivations, sources, and methods, is exemplified by Schudt’s discussion of 
Jewish slaughter. On first impression, the book may seem to belong quite squarely 
within the early-modern Hebraist tradition discussed above. Indeed, the chapter 
on Jewish slaughter does not begin with the Biblical command, but rather with a 
medieval Jewish text, which deems meat slaughtered by Christians to be 
“unclean.” “Only for us it is unknown,” Schudt reveals to his readers, “that the 
Jews consider that which the Christian slaughter as unclean and as carrion [nevela], 
an uncleanliness which is stirred by the devil, so that even if a Jew only carries 
such meat, he would become highly polluted.”47  
Though in his work Schudt repeats many of the most demeaning stereotypes 
associated with the Jews, his work as a whole transcends the bounds of its genre. 
Jews, in Schudt’s account, are lazy, dishonest, stingy, and superstitious, and lead 
unclean and unhealthy lives. But instead of merely repeating these stereotypes and 
attributing them, as some of his predecessors have done, to the essential character 
of the Jew—an internally Satanic evil commonly associated with the murderers of 
the son of God, for example—he often offers an empirical and rationalized 
explanation for these peculiarities. For Schudt, Jews are lazy and unproductive 
only because they have for centuries been deprived of privileges and denied access 
 
47. Here, as in many other places, Schudt relies on accurate even if highly manipulative and 
selective sources published by Eisenmenger (1654–1704) in his infamous, JOHAN ANDREAS 
EISENMENGER, ENTDECKTES JUDENTHUM [JUDAISM UNVEILED] (Königsberg, 1711).  
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to many professions, and they smell bad not because they have associated with the 
devil, but simply because their diet includes unreasonable amounts of garlic. If the 
Jews must convert, it is only because their customs have become an inseparable 
part of their religion and character. 
Probably the most interesting aspect of Schudt’s work is that he not only 
wrote about Jewish life in general, but also focused on the Jews of his own city, 
Frankfurt. Each chapter of the second volume is devoted to a different aspect of 
Jewish custom and ritual—from shabbath and holidays to kapparoth and shehitah—
but the emphasis in each is on details Schudt was able to gather about the Jewish 
community he knew. Thus, for example, the chapter on Jewish slaughter, titled 
“On the Slaughtering and Selling of Meat of the Frankfurt Jewry,” offers specific 
information about the Jewish ghetto, the Jüdische Gasse, some of which seems to 
have come from firsthand knowledge.  
It is from a similar perspective—the move from theology to anthropology—
that one may read some of Schudt’s specific observations about traditional Jewish 
slaughter. Even before Schudt, the vilification of ritual slaughter had a practical 
side to it, which has often been neglected. In many towns and villages, Jews made 
their living by selling meat to Gentiles and competed against Christian butchers. 
Consequently, one of the more popular aims of the assault on Jewish slaughter 
was to convince potential Christian customers to avoid buying meat from the 
Jews. A common allegation in many of the anti-Jewish texts of the Hebraists was 
that Jewish butchers encouraged their children to purposefully defile the meat sold 
to Christians by spitting on it in order to bring sickness and death upon them. 
Though Schudt cites these allegations, he immediately questions their validity and 
goes as far as to name them libel. But then, instead of dismissing the accusations, 
he offers a rational explanation for their creation. Jews, he tells us, are required to 
inspect the corpse of slaughtered cattle and search for lesions that would make the 
animal not kosher. Specifically, they are required to check that the lungs of the 
animal have not been punctured, and for that purpose they often use spit to clean 
a suspicious spot and check if the surface beneath it has indeed been injured.48  
Schudt thus clears the Jews of one allegation only to condemn them with 
another. Referring to the actual practice of the Jewish butcher, he writes,  
I thought it should offend one’s entire appetite, so that one need only 
note the unclean, invidious, foul knife and the apron, which seems more 
similar to that covering a knacker, who skins dead animals, than to a 
 
     48.  JOHANN JACOB SCHUDT, JÜDISCHE MERCKWÜRDIGKEITEN VORSTELLENDE WAS 
SICH CURIEUSES UND DENCKWÜRDIGES IN DEN DEUERN ZEITEN BEY EINIGEN JAHR-
HUNDERTEN MIT DENEN IN ALLE IV. THEILE DER WELT, SONDERLICH DURCH TEUTSCHLAND, 
ZERTREUTEN JUDEN ZUGETRAGEN: SAMT EINER VOLLSTÄNDIGEN FRANCKFURTER JUDEN-
CHRONICK, DARINNEN DER ZU FRANCKFURT AM MAYN WOHNENDEN JUDEN VON EINIGEN 
JAHR-HUNDERTEN BISS AUFF UNSERE ZEITEN MERCKWÜRDIGSTE BEGEBENHEITEN ENTHALTEN 
972 (Franckfurt und Leipzig 1714‒1718). 
Assembled_Issue_3 v5 (Do Not Delete) 2/22/2012  9:07 AM 
832 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol.  1:3 
 
butcher, how bloody, how dirty, how unclean is the apron, . . . brought 
about out of such evilness.49  
It is important to note, however, that Schudt is willing to rationalize the 
hatred toward the Jews much more than he is willing to find rational grounds for 
Jews’ hatred of Christians. He not only refrains from rationalizing this hate, but, 
quite to the contrary, he enchants it. The chapter, which opens with the 
superstitious hatred of Jews toward Christians, thus performs a double reversal. 
First, it is not the Christians who are impure but rather the Jews, and second, 
whereas the impurity that the Jews associate with Christians belongs to the realm 
of the supernatural, the hatred that Christians bear toward the Jews has its 
grounding in reason.  
Schudt’s work, like much of the anthropological writing that would follow, 
can be characterized by this double move of disenchantment and reenchantment. 
On the one hand, anthropology is known for making cultures and customs that 
are distant and foreign more comprehensible, but on the other hand, and perhaps 
in a less obvious way, it strives to make that which is, in fact, becoming ever more 
familiar into something strange, alien, and enchanted. For Schudt the Jews of 
Frankfurt were both distant and near. Some of their traditions may have seemed 
quite alien to an outside observer, but, clearly, the practice of slaughter was quite 
familiar at least to some Christians, who, as Schudt notes, often bought such meat 
and were present at its slaughter. Under the anthropological gaze of the last of the 
great Hebraists, Jews become an ethnicity and their traditional practices emerge as 
religious ritual.  
Orientalism 
The association of Jewish tradition with the Orient at the turn of the 
nineteenth century marked a clear transformation of the critique of Judaism from 
theology to anthropology and initiated a new stage of the “ritualization” process. 
The claim that the Jews are a nomadic people whose traditions reflect their 
original habitat became popularized already in the eighteenth century through the 
writings of German Orientalists such as David Michaelis.50 The theme, which 
appears in the writings of German writers, from Herder to Hegel, became a 
cultural trope in the course of the nineteenth century. There was no precise 
definition of the Orient, which was identified with the Far East as much as with 
the Near East, and with the Indians and the Chinese as much as with the Arabs 
and, as it turned out, the Jews. Though initially used in a pejorative sense, by the 
early twentieth century the Oriental identity was embraced by some German-
Jewish intellectuals.51  
 
49. Id.  
50. For a collection of essays on the topic, see ORIENTALISM AND THE JEWS (Ivan Davidson 
Kalmar & Derek Jonathan Penslar eds., 2005). 
51. See David A. Brenner, Marketing Identities: The Invention of Jewish Ethnicity, in OST UND WEST 
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Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the association of Jews with the 
Orient during that period. These studies have often taken Said’s Orientalist 
critique as their point of departure, comparing the writings on Muslims with those 
about Jews.52 For current purposes, what is important is not the dynamics of 
power between center and periphery, which no doubt governed the discourse, but 
rather its concrete manifestation: the conceptualization of religious practice as 
ritual.  
The association of Jewish ritual with Islam and the life of a desert tribe 
opened the possibility for a simultaneous process of secularization and 
ritualization of traditional practices. On the one hand, Jewish laws and specifically 
the dietary code were explained as a primitive yet protorational response to the 
conditions of the Orient. On the other hand, the very association of the Jews with 
the exotic desert tribes recontextualized the Jews outside of Europe and infused 
Jewish practice with cultish signification.  
Attempts to rationalize Jewish practice were especially prominent with 
respect to the dietary laws, such as the prohibition on the consumption of certain 
kinds of animals, particularly pork, and the separation of meat from milk. Jewish 
apologists defended the continued relevance of the Jewish dietary laws on the 
basis of the new science of nutrition. Similarly, liberal-leaning Jews, while 
admitting that many dietary laws were no longer appropriate, attempted to ground 
the original Biblical prohibition in new scientific theories. Consuming meat 
together with milk or the consumption of camel meat was said to be unhealthy for 
digestion.53  
Ritual slaughter served as an ideal case for emphasizing the affinity between 
Jewish and Muslim practice. Despite some notable differences, the two practices 
shared much in common and were commonly referred to as Schächten (from the 
Hebrew shehitah), or rituelles Schlachten (ritual slaughter). First and foremost, both 
require that the animal be killed by means of a sharp cut to the throat that severs 
the trachea and the esophagus along with the main blood vessels, allowing the 
blood to pour out. A common argument tying the two traditions together made 
reference to the advantage of draining the blood from the meat in the desert 
climate of the Orient, as meat saturated with blood would rot more quickly and be 
more susceptible to disease.  
Alongside attempts to give Jewish ritual a rational significance through the 
sciences of medicine and nutrition, there was a parallel attempt to infuse Jewish 
practice with ritualistic significance. History, archeology, and the new science of 
the Orient were brought to bear on the origins of the Jewish tradition. In 1869, 
 
77 (1998). 
52.  See, e.g., GIL ANIDJAR, SEMITES: RACE, RELIGION, LITERATURE (2007). 
53. For a general overview, see Thomas Schlich, The Word of God and the Word of Science: 
Nutrition Science and the Jewish Dietary Laws in Germany, 1820–1920, in HARMKE KAMMINGA AND 
ANDREW CUNNINGHAM (EDS.) THE SCIENCE AND CULTURE OF NUTRITION (1995) 97‒128.  
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the renowned author Johan Dümichen, who had returned from an expedition in 
the Nile Valley, published his book on the historical inscriptions of ancient 
Egyptian monuments in Leipzig.54 Among the inscriptions was a relief from an 
Egyptian temple, which showed the sacrifices to the goddess Misaphris, who 
supposedly was buried in this temple. The relief offered a visual depiction of the 
ancient practice of ritual slaughter, including the knife-cut, the pouring of the 
blood to the ground, and the offering of the animal to the gods. The archeological 
artifact vindicated the long-held opinion of both Orientalists and lay observers 
that the Jewish ritual of animal slaughter had its origins not in the Biblical word of 
God, but rather in a pagan tradition of the old Egyptians. The Jews, who fled 
from Egypt around 1500 BCE, incorporated the practice into their religion and 
carried it with them into the new land.  
Calling attention to the affinities between Jewish and Oriental custom 
assumed a new understanding of Jewish religion and its place in Europe. Judaism 
was no longer dialectically associated with Christianity, as both its religious 
forerunner and arch rival, and became merely one among many Oriental religions, 
and a stranger to Western and Christian culture. A Berliner magazine gave voice to 
this emerging sentiment, in a critical article on Jewish slaughter. The author rejects 
the comparison of Jewish ritual with the Catholic profession of faith, due to the 
inhumanness of the former. The Jewish custom should rather be equated with that 
of Muslims, who are known for their cruelty to animals. “Supporters of the ritual,” 
the author concluded “occupy the same cultural level as adherents of the 
Koran.”55 
Jewish Mysticism and Animal Slaughter 
The ritualization of Jewish custom was not limited to external observers, but 
was internalized in different ways by members of the Jewish community. In fact, 
radical changes in the interpretation and practice of Jewish law, including animal 
slaughter, took place within the Jewish religious community some time before 
Jewish emancipation and the secularization processes that accompanied it. These 
changes are closely related to the rise of Hasidism in Eastern Europe, an Orthodox 
movement which sought to enliven Jewish experience and popularize religious 
devotion through mystical experience. The Hasidic movement gave rise to a fierce 
struggle between its followers and its opponents, the Mithnagdim (literally, the 
“opposing”), which for several decades threatened to tear apart the Jewish 
community. Interestingly, one of the earliest and most contentious controversies 
between the parties was concerned with the meaning and practice of animal 
 
54. JOHAN DÜMICHEN, HISTORISCHE INSCHRIFTEN ALTÄGYPTISCHER DENKMÄLER 
(Leipzig, 1869), 2. FOLGE, NEBST EINIGEN GEOGRAPHISCHEN UND MYTHOLOGISCHEN 
INSCHRIFTEN, TABLE 30. 
55. MACKEL N. GREVENMACHER, REFERAT, 10(7) RUNDSCHAU AUF DEM GEBIETE DER 
GESAMTEN FLEISCHBESCHAU UND TRICHINENSCHAU (1909).  
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slaughter.  
The Hasidic movement, which succeeded in winning over a large portion of 
the Jewish population in the East, had very limited success in Western Europe and 
hardly any at all in German-speaking territories. This fact is commonly associated 
with the general image of German Jewry as a rationalist, enlightened, and elitist 
community, which rejected the more mystical and superstitious trends of Hasidic 
Judaism. This common perception may be hard to deny, but it does not tell the 
full story. Specifically, it does not account for the exceptional story of Rabbi 
Natan Adler and his followers.  
Rabbi Natan Adler was a highly respected Jewish scholar in Frankfurt, and a 
pious and humble man. He was praised by his students and coreligionists as the 
“Great Eagle,” a play on his German name and a reference to the medieval Great 
Eagle, Maimonides. On August 15, 1779, Adler was accused of heresy, 
excommunicated, and forced to leave his native city. The ban, which was directed 
against Adler, his close follower Leizer and his students, was quite extreme and 
left Adler isolated within his own community. Forced to leave Frankfurt, Adler 
became a rabbi and religious leader in Boskovitz (Moravia), only to be denounced 
once again by his new community, primarily for his practice of animal slaughter. 
For many years, Adler remained a figure of questionable repute, and it was only 
toward the end of his life that the Frankfurt community accepted him back and he 
was rehabilitated.56 
Many and varied were the accusations leading to the ban from Frankfurt. 
Adler was charged with introducing significant changes into the wording and 
custom of prayers, adding stringent ritual practices, such as excessive fasting and 
self-abnegation, and leading his students astray by teaching them practices of 
Jewish mysticism, such as the interpretation of dreams. One of the accusations 
leveled against Adler in Frankfurt, which later became central to his banishment 
from Boskovitz, was that he had altered the old tradition of animal slaughter.  
The explanation for Adler’s unorthodox practice of animal slaughter was his 
mystical belief in reincarnation (gilgul )  and specifically his belief in the 
reincarnation of a human soul into an animal body. According to certain kabalistic 
teachings, the souls of grave sinners, who pass away unrepentant, are punished by 
being reincarnated into an animal body. Sometimes the punishment may turn out 
to be a stage on their way to redemption. This happens when God in his mercy 
deposits the human soul in the body of a pure (kosher) animal. When such an 
animal is properly slaughtered or, according to some versions, when it is 
slaughtered in kosher fashion and eaten, atonement is made for its sins and the 
soul is elevated back to its human form. But all of this will happen only if the 
 
56. Rachel Elior, Rabbi Nathan Adler of Frankfurt and the Controversy Surrounding Him, in 
MYSTICISM, MAGIC AND KABBALAH IN ASHKENAZI JUDAISM 223 (K.E. Grozinger & J. Dan eds., 
1995); Jacob Katz, Towards a Biography of the Hatam Sofer, in DIVINE LAW IN HUMAN HANDS: CASE 
STUDIES IN HALAKHIC FLEXIBILITY (1998). 
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slaughter follows the strictest ritual procedure, and first and foremost, on 
condition that the knife’s blade is perfectly smooth and sharp.  
It was not the heresy of his beliefs, however, that provoked the wrath of the 
community. The belief in reincarnation was as old as the early kabalistic writings 
from the twelfth century, and the idea that a human soul may reincarnate into an 
animal body, according to Gershom Scholem, dates back to the thirteenth 
century.57 There is ample evidence that by the seventeenth century, the belief had 
spread across the Jewish world and even appeared, on occasion, in prefaces to 
halachic treatises on Shehitah u’Bedika (slaughter and examination of the carcass). 
What led to Adler’s excommunication was not the heresy of his mystical beliefs, 
but rather his translation of these beliefs into a religious reform. It was one thing, 
in fact quite common, to study kabala and believe in the supernatural, but quite 
another thing to preach halachic change and to insist on the basis of mystical 
knowledge that the regular blade used by community butchers for centuries was 
inappropriate and had to be replaced.58 Adler’s mysticism was perceived as a threat 
precisely because it constituted a break from tradition and an attempt to reenchant 
an already disenchanted world. Adler sought to reform religious customs and to 
popularize esoteric knowledge.  
Adler was a truly exceptional figure, but his attempt to suffuse the traditional 
practice of animal slaughter with spiritual meaning was not exceptional. It had its 
parallels in Eastern Europe, and was carried on by some of Adler’s students in 
Germany. Thus, for example, one of Adler’s outstanding students, Yosef 
Schneituch, composed a special prayer for the shohet to recite before each 
slaughtering, or, if he lacked the leisure, at least once a day. The prayer includes 
the following lines:  
Master of all worlds . . . May it be your wish that in accordance with the 
laws of slaughter which you have commanded and through the use of the 
knife which I have sharpened as you have commanded in the holy 
scripture (torah), that if there is any sparkle (nitzotz) in this animal . . . by 
the observance of this commandment it will be removed from the animal 
and elevated to its former human stature.59 
 
57. Gerschom Scholem, Gilgul: The Transmigration of Souls, in ON THE MYSTICAL SHAPE OF 
THE GODHEAD (1991), 197‒250.  
58. An account, which was published many years after the fact, by Avraham Yehuda 
Ha’Cohen Schwartz, a descendent of one of Adler’s students, reads as follows: “It is the story of 
Rabbi Natan Adler and his student Rabbi Moshe Sofer from Pressburg, both of whom were 
knowledgeable in Jewish mysticism. Rabbi Natan Adler sought to disqualify the shohatim in 
Frankfurt, and thus overpower the influence that the Other Side [סטרא אחרא] had on disqualified 
shohatim . . . . If he had managed to entirely fulfill his wishes the Messiah would have come, but 
Satan had brought upon him butchers that persecuted him and he had to flee from Frankfurt. And his 
student, Moshe, ran after him by foot many miles.” ABRAHAM J. SCHWARTZ, DEREKH HA-NESHER 
V’E-TORAT EMET 25–26 (1924 or 1925) . 
59. YOSEF BEN MEIR (RIVAM) SCHNEITUCH RESPONSA, Chapter 10, Responsa 6 (Shemu’el 
Zan v’il beha-manoa Mosheh B.P, 1890) .  
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A similar interpretation of Jewish ritual can be found in one of the more 
interesting treatises on the subject, “Ohel Issachar,” which was published in 
Altona in 1826, more or less at the time when the first societies for the prevention 
of cruelty to animals were being founded. The author, Issachar Ber Lichtenstein, 
from Krotoschin (a small town southeast of Posen), connects the belief in gilgul 
with a concern with animal suffering:  
And indeed how greatly is the shohet warned not to disqualify the 
slaughter, because it is possible that in this animal there lies a soul that is 
meant to be released now in the blessing over the slaughter . . . and it is 
known that if the animal is slit from the nape, or by one of the things 
which disqualify the slaughter, then the blood of the animal is sucked 
back into its limbs and it is immensely painful, so much so that the 
animal does not have the strength to moan and to exert her spirit and her 
blood, and there is no greater cruelty (tsa’ar ba’aley chaim) to the animal 
than that.60  
Lichtenstein’s explanation integrates three distinct traditions. The first, and 
probably the most ancient, grounds the rules of Jewish slaughter in the prohibition 
against the consumption of blood. The second, which has its origins in the Middle 
Ages, sees the rules of shehitah as being intended to forestall unnecessary suffering 
to the animal. And finally, the third, which we have already encountered, grounds 
the practice in mystical thought. All three echo old traditions, but also bear certain 
similarities to new concerns with animal cruelty which began to emerge. 
The mystical treatment of Jewish slaughter, and this is more than a mere play 
on words, spiritualized the animal soul and animated religious belief. In this 
context, one can see the late eighteenth-century debate as foreshadowing not only 
the rationalization of animal welfare, but also the nineteenth-century construction 
of shehitah as a religious ritual and as part of a newly emerging sense of religion. 
Reform and Neo-Orthodoxy: Command and Symbol 
The “ritualization” of Jewish law stood at the center of a contentious 
struggle between the Reform movement (Reform Verein) and the more traditionalist 
branches of German Jewry. Though the Reform movement is commonly 
associated with enlightenment and rationality, and with the rejection of certain 
aspects of Jewish law as superstitious and unbecoming of a modern age, the 
rational critique of religion captures only one side of the debate. The other 
concerns the role of ritual and symbol in religion. Jewish reformers not only 
rejected certain ritualistic aspects of Jewish tradition as superstitious and irrational, 
but, first and foremost, they identified traditional Jewish practices as rituals. 
Leading members of the Reform movement rejected the overly “ceremonial” 
aspects of Jewish religion. What mattered in their eyes was the underlying 
 
60. ISSACHAR BER LICHTENSTEIN, SEFER OHEL ISSACHAR (Altona, 1826). 
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significance or symbolic meaning of a commandment (mitzvah), rather than the 
minutiae of its observance. Traditional practices needed to be reformed in a way 
that would make them more dignified and of truly spiritual significance. 
Otherwise, all that remained was an empty shell, which should be abandoned. 
Thus, the dietary laws were abolished because they lacked significant symbolic 
meaning, whereas the Jewish Sabbath, which symbolized rest, could be 
maintained, but according to some reformers, such as Holdheim, it should be 
celebrated on Sunday to align it with Christian practice and create a shared day of 
rest.61 
In his study of the history of the Reform movement in Germany and the 
United States, Michael Meyer addresses the further development of these ideas in 
the writings of the second generation of Reform leaders, such as Emil Hirsch (the 
son of the renowned German Reform rabbi, Samuel Hirsch), who became a 
prominent figure in the United States. “The dietary laws are a survival of a species 
of totemism,” Hirsch wrote, adding that the research of W. Robertson Smith had 
made that fact quite plain. Circumcision was originally a ceremony of initiation 
into the tribe or clan. Kohler described the later tefilin (phylacteries) and mezuzah 
(biblical inscription on the doorpost) as “talismans” whose origins lay in primitive 
blood daubing, and he called the wearing of the talit (prayer shawl) “fetishism.” 
Such laws, spurned by Reform Jews in practice, appeared to be totally discredited 
by the discovery of their parallels elsewhere in the ancient Near East.62 
The effort to suffuse traditional religious practice with symbolic meaning was 
by no means limited to liberal theology, nor was it exclusively employed to 
criticize and reform Jewish tradition. One finds early signs of the “ritualization” of 
Jewish tradition already in Mendelssohn’s attempt defend the “ceremonial” 
character of the divine commandments in his book Jerusalem.63 In what has been 
considered by many to be a very obscure passage, and by Mendelssohn himself a 
“digression,” the author sketches an outline of a theory of language and symbolic 
meaning.64 Briefly stated, Mendelssohn argues that written language in general and 
symbolic script in particular is limited in its ability to convey exact meaning. Dead 
letters always require interpretation and symbolic script can easily be 
misinterpreted (Mendelssohn goes as far as to argue that the misinterpretation of 
written symbols lies at the origin of idolatry). By contrast, he argues, oral language 
and symbolic action are much better suited to this purpose, for their meaning is 
fully embodied in the oral tradition and ritual practice. Whether we find 
 
61. DAVID PHILIPSON, THE REFORM MOVEMENT IN JUDAISM 289 (1907) (quoting Samuel 
Holdheim).  
62. MEYER, supra note 17, at 273 (discussing Emil Hirsch the son). 
63. See generally MOSES MENDELSSOHN & ALLAN ARKUSH, JERUSALEM, OR, ON RELIGIOUS 
POWER AND JUDAISM (1983). 
64. Arnold Eisen, Divine Legislation As “Ceremonial Script”: Mendelssohn on the Commandments, 15 
ASS’N FOR JEWISH STUD. REV. 239, 239–67 (1990). 
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Mendelssohn’s argument convincing or not, he himself believed he was laying the 
grounds for a possible justification of the oral and ceremonial characteristics of 
Jewish law. 
Despite the novel approach, Mendelssohn himself never took the further 
step of spelling out the precise symbolic meaning of Jewish rituals. Strikingly 
enough, his innovative approach was eventually implemented by the founding 
father of Jewish neo-Orthodoxy in Germany, Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch. 
According to Hirsch, all Jewish laws have a symbolic meaning, the decipherment 
of which stood at the center of his teachings. The notion that Jewish law has 
symbolic meaning appears, as Hirsch himself pointed out, in traditional sources. 
What nevertheless made his interpretation both novel and radical was his 
argument that all Jewish law was symbolic, and that its symbolism was not of 
supplementary significance, but rather constituted the ultimate telos of Divine 
commandment. His commitment to the Talmudic interpretation of Biblical law 
led him to find symbolic meaning not in the general formulations of the 
commandments, as some Reformers had done, but through interpretation of the 
minute details of the commandments, giving consideration to the symbolic 
meaning of both script and ritual. Hirsch, like Mendelssohn, turned the critique of 
Jewish ceremonial law on its head, claiming that the existence of ritual not only 
makes sense, but is in many ways necessary precisely because it is ritualistic and 
symbolic.65 Though Hirsch does not offer a full account of animal slaughter in his 
writings, his interpretations of many other “ritualistic” practices, including the 
sacrifice of animals in the Temple, were very elaborate and highly innovative. 
State Law and Ritualization 
Before concluding, I would like to offer a few comments on the relationship 
between ritualization and state law. As opposed to the effects of processes of 
secularization, those of ritualization on state law are much harder to document. 
Clearly, the very fact that Jewish practices were “ritualized” and thus singled out as 
exotic played an important role in turning public opinion against them and 
prompting the state bureaucracy to place limitations on them. Similarly, but 
leading to opposite consequences, the attempts to reform Jewish tradition and 
bring it in tune with prevailing Protestant practices made the Jewish rituals more 
acceptable to the Christian public and administration. And yet, it would be a 
mistake to conclude that ritualization was limited to public opinion and had no 
legal and political implications. Like secularization, ritualization too had a 
multifaceted impact on the law, at times working to intensify the conflict between 
religious practice and state regulation, at other times helping to demonstrate their 
 
65. EISEN, supra note 35, at 135–55. For a broader perspective on Rabbi Hirsch, see ROBERT 
LIBERLES, RELIGIOUS CONFLICT IN SOCIAL CONTEXT: THE RESURGENCE OF ORTHODOX 
JUDAISM IN FRANKFURT AM MAIN, 1838–1877 (1985).  
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compatibility.  
Indeed, by the second half of the nineteenth century, when ritual slaughter 
came under legal attack, the debate was not limited to questions of animal welfare 
and hygiene. Since one of the strongest arguments in defense of Jewish slaughter 
was religious freedom, one of the main counterarguments by its opponents was 
that the practice was not really part of Jewish religion, but rather mere ritual (Ritus 
or Kutlus).66 The argument was based on the observation, correct in itself, that the 
minute details of the practice, particularly the knife-cut and consequently the 
prohibition on the stunning of the animal, did not appear in the Biblical text.  
Thus, when the question of animal slaughter reached the Reichstag in the 
late 1880s its supporters, including most prominently Dr. Windthorst, head of the 
Catholic Central Party (Zentrum Partei), endorsed the practice by countering the 
allegation that it did not belong to traditional Jewish custom. Windthorst, 
Bismarck’s main rival during the Kulturkampf, strongly advocated religious 
tolerance and defended ritual slaughter by Jews:  
I have looked into the matter and I am convinced that the Orthodox 
Jews will take a great offence at this proposal and so they must do . . .  
because the proposal stands in conflict with the views, which they have 
had since youth, views which originate out of Mosaic times, which we too 
have experienced in the first days of Christianity; since we can indeed be 
confident, that the early Christians still observed the aforementioned 
command [Gebot].67 
It is interesting to note that in the case of circumcision, “ritualization” 
worked in a different way. When, in the mid-nineteenth century, Jewish parents of 
newborn children refused to circumcise their children, but nevertheless desired to 
have them registered as eligible members of the Jewish community, many rabbis 
inclined to Orthodoxy would not allow it. The parents applied to the authorities, 
claiming that according to Jewish law, circumcision was not a precondition for 
becoming a Jew. Though the argument was unquestionably correct according to 
traditional Jewish law, the rabbis did not accept it. Some argued that circumcision 
could be compared to baptism, as a rite de passage which was a necessary 
precondition for acceptance into the community of faith. There was little 
precedent for any such claim in traditional sources, and the rabbis no doubt drew 
the analogy only as a strategic move, but even as such it was very telling.68  
CONCLUSION 
Around the turn of the nineteenth century, the Jewish community in 
Germany and its laws underwent a radical transformation. Ancient traditions were 
 
66. Reichstag proceedings, 18 May 1887, 632.  
67. Id.  
68. JUDD, supra note 23, at 22. 
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discarded, the autonomy of the Jewish community was infringed, emancipation 
was gradually becoming a tangible reality, and Enlightenment ideals led to the 
crumbling of the social and mental walls of the Ghetto. Conditions were ripe for 
the transformation of old conceptions of Jewish law and the rise of modern 
alternatives, a transformation which was indeed underway. But what precisely was 
its nature? 
An observer of Jewish custom approaching this history with a Weberian lens 
will assume that the old, superstitious, mystical, and otherworldly ideas about 
traditional practices were replaced with modern, worldly, and more rational 
notions. And that religion gradually became compatible with emerging notions of 
enlightenment, civility, and a personal profession of faith.  
And yet, the secularization thesis offers only a partial account of the 
historical transformations of Jewish law, and the closer one explores this history 
the more one-sided the Weberian account appears. First, enchanted accounts of 
Jewish law emerged alongside modern practices of disenchantment and were 
clearly not dispelled by them. This is true as much for Adler’s mysticism as for 
Schudt’s ethnographic writings and the Orientalist exoticism. Second, Jewish 
practices were enchanted through their “ritualization,” that is, by shifting the sense 
of the law from the minute details of its practice to its deep signification and 
symbolic meaning. This shift took place not only in the writings of external 
observers, but also from within the religious community, including its Orthodox 
wing. Third, enchantment or ritualization, and disenchantment or rationalization 
were not mutually exclusive and, in the final analysis, complemented each other in 
a variety of ways. At times, ritualization came as a counterresponse to 
overrationalization, other times, the two were part of a joint project to decipher 
the sense of traditional practices in the search for meaning, and still on other 
occasions, the interpretation of traditional practices as enchanted was a projection 
of the reverse image of a rational and disenchanted present onto an irrational and 
enchanted past.  
The close affinity and interdependence between schemes of rationalization 
and schemes of ritualization allows us to return by way of conclusion to some of 
the remarks made in the preface. If, indeed, the history of Jewish law can be read 
as a parable of the “law and” and “law as . . .” of legal history, what lesson can this 
parable teach? 
Let us assume (with “law as . . .”) that the challenge that legal theory and 
legal historiography face today is how to think critically beyond the 
disenchantment of law and its manifestations in legal realism and the variety of 
“law and” scholarship. The alternative proposed by “law as . . .” seeks to expose 
the deceit that underlies this rationalist and disenchanted image of modern law. 
Law, so the argument goes, is much less rational than we customarily think. Its 
most mundane operations bear deeper signification, traces of the transcendental, 
and remnants of a political theology. Law is imaginative and legal scholarship and 
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historiography must take seriously the metaphoric, symbolic, and transrational 
dimensions of law.  
But what if, as the history of Jewish law hints, the search for deeper 
signification and hidden meaning in a seemingly disenchanted law is not a critical 
alternative, but merely a complementary effect? What if, to paraphrase Heidegger, 
disenchantment does not exclude enchantment, and it is rather through legal 
disenchantment that legal enchantment comes to the fore? Is this not the case 
with the current historiographical and psychological investigation of law as myth? 
If, however, “law as . . .” is not a satisfactory alternative to “law and” what 
other alternatives are open for the study of legal history? This paper has offered 
two possible and complementary lines of inquiry. First, the close affinity and 
interrelationship between the enchantment of law and its disenchantment is in 
itself worthy of investigation. Demonstrating the way these two seemingly 
mutually exclusive processes work in tandem, and inquiring into the logic of their 
codependence reveals important dimensions of modern law. Second, seeing 
beyond the modern dialectics of religion and secularism may open new 
possibilities for understanding the past. The history of Jewish law prior to its 
“ritualization” offers one possible venue. This history suggests that a focus on the 
minute details of legal practice was a dominant alternative to a search for meaning, 
whether enchanted or disenchanted. The possibility of thinking of law as neither 
disenchanted nor enchanted has not been fully explored in this paper, but only 
hinted at. The question remains whether it is possible to think of law neither 
through the prism of “law and” nor through that of “law as . . . .” What precisely 
would such a possibility entail? 
 
 
 
